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; the contribution of early intervention programmes in preventing and reducing crime; 'creative maths' in the selection of disposals within counting rules (Morgan, 2009) ; and the 'main' factor identified by witnesses to a recent inquiry by the Justice Select Committee: '…changes to the way in which offending is dealt with by the authorities' (House of Commons, 2013: 7) . Encouraged by shrinking public sector budgets and the introduction of so-called 'austerity measures' following the 2008 global financial crisis, as well as the revision of official performance measures (discussed in more detail below), there is evidence of practice innovations that have outstripped the pace of policy change (see, for example, Bateman 2014). Significant among these, and the focus of this article, are the various pre-statutory schemes set up by police forces and youth justice services to 'divert' young people accused of first or minor offences from prosecution, and from FTE statistics (Haines et al., 2012; Home Office 2012; Youth Justice Board, 2011) .
The examination of these diversion schemes is a growing area of interest politically and among scholars (see also Bateman, 2012; Carlile, 2014; Cushing, 2014; Haines, et al., 2013; Richards, 2014; Smith, 2014) .
Drawing on qualitative interviews with youth justice practitioners and documentary research conducted as part of a broader research project exploring policy implementation in youth justice, we consider such initiatives in two locations in England. We explore managerial claims that the new diversionary focus represents a 'sea change' in practice, but argue for a more nuanced assessment. We suggest that current practices reflect the continued influence of New Labour reforms, particularly in relation to standardisation of practice, actuarial risk assessment and a commitment to welfare-oriented early intervention. This leads us to argue that a 'new interventionist diversion' is observable, which differs in important aspects from the noninterventionist understandings of 'diversion' prominent during earlier historical periods -notably in England and Wales during the 1980s and early 1990s (Allen, 1991; Bateman, 2002) .
In noting ambiguity in the meanings of and rationales for diversion, and the ways in which this label has been applied to highly varied diversionary practices, our argument reflects claims recently made by Richards (2014) about diversion in the context of Australian youth justice. The empirical findings presented here indicate, however, that the conceptual project she recommends of detangling the domains of 'primary crime prevention' (which we refer to as universal support services), 'early intervention' and 'diversion' is beset with difficulties -at least within the studied jurisdiction. Our research suggests the notion that 'diversion from crime' depends on intervention through which criminogenic risk factors can be mitigated (for example, Farrington, 2000) is now broadly accepted by practitioners as well as policy-makers. Thus, intervention without criminalisation in the form of a criminal record was judged to be both necessary and helpful by many of our participants, especially in the context of reduced investment in universal child and family support services in England as in other neo-liberal societies (Connolly and Morris, 2012) , the removal of 'ring-fenced' funding for youth justice prevention work in the context of reduced Youth Offending Team (YOT) budgets (House of Commons, 2013) ii and raised thresholds and an increased early years focus within specialist child protection (Allen, 2011; Carlile, 2014) . We would therefore argue, reflecting comments made about 'risk' and 'need' in early intervention services (see for example, Smith, 2005) , that rethinking the role of 'diversion' in youth justice has ramifications well beyond the youth justice 'system' insofar as this is equated with the work carried out by youth offending teams. Varied local practices and the diversity of service structures within which YOTs now sit (Fielder et al., 2008) , heralds considerable challenges for researchers attempting to assess what forms of 'system contact' help and hinder, or indeed how forms of 'prevention', 'early intervention' and 'diversion' are developing within any given local authority area in England, let alone the jurisdiction as a whole.
Diverse meanings of diversion
The drive to divert young people from aspects of formal criminal justice processes has a long history. The
Children's Act 1908 established separate juvenile courts to divert young people from the adult court process in recognition of the different needs of child and adult offenders and the responsibility of the state to consider the welfare of young people coming before the courts (Arthur, 2010) . A more radical conception of 'diversion' emerged in the United States in the mid-twentieth century in the context of new sociological theoriesnamely 'labelling theory' -which emphasised the stigmatising consequences of applying deviant or criminal labels that cast deviants as 'outsiders' (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1967) . This was believed to promote selfidentification with the applied label and forms of discrimination, which together serve to 'amplify' deviance.
When applied to criminal justice practice, this way of understanding crime and criminalisation logically promotes strategies that minimise labelling -in other words, non-intervention (Schur, 1973) or minimum possible intervention and the reduction of contact with formal criminal justice systems.
Critical criminologists and campaigning organisations in England and Wales have also emphasised that most youth crime is relatively minor and that the majority of children will 'grow out' of crime (for example, National
Association for Youth Justice, 2013; Rutherford, 1986; 1992) . This observation, bolstered by empirical research suggesting contact with formal criminal justice systems inhibits this process (Kemp et al., 2002; McAra and McVie, 2007) , also lends support to noninterventionist approaches. The recent Independent Parliamentarians'
Inquiry into the Operation and Effectiveness of the Youth Court headed by Lord Carlile (2014: ix) found that there was 'wide support for high levels of diversion among inquiry respondents', in part due to this body of evidence.
What this means in practice can be complex. Cressey and McDermott (1974: 3) discussed the difficulties in securing a single and clear definition of 'diversion' in their research on diversionary programmes in the United
States. They identified several central problematic areas including: contested and contradictory definitions of diversion, definitions of 'system contact' and definitions of formal/informal provision. Similar concerns have recently been explored by Richards (2014: 122) who asks four interrelated questions to tease out these issues:
…what young people are to be diverted from and to; whether young people are to be 'diverted' from the criminal justice system or offending; whether young people are to be 'diverted' from criminal justice processes or outcomes; and whether diversion should be considered distinct from crime prevention and early intervention.
We would suggest that at least five understandings of diversion can now be identified within academic and policy discourse: i) 'diversion from prosecution/court'; ii) 'diversion from custody'; iii) 'diversion from the youth justice system'; iv) 'diversion into alternative services'; v) 'diversion from crime'. Each of these meanings addresses Cressey and McDermott's (1974) and Richard's (2014) questions in different ways and has its own history in relation to youth justice in England and Wales. Some are also ambiguous: as we discuss below, the notion of diverting from the 'youth justice system', in particular, depends on where the boundaries of 'youth justice work' are drawn. Of particular relevance to current practice is the shift in political rhetoric and policy from 'diversion-from-prosecution', associated in England and Wales with the promotion of youth cautioning during the 1980s and early 1990s (Home Office, 1985; 1990) , to 'diversion from crime', associated the more interventionist youth justice strategies identifiable from the mid 1990s (Audit Commission 1996) and central to the policies introduced by the New Labour Government from 1997 (Home Office, 1997). We then go on to ask to what extent, and with what implications, this has since been reversed by practitioners.
From 'diversion-from-prosecution' to 'diversion-from-crime'
The principles of minimal or non-intervention were most visibly enacted in juvenile justice practice in England during the 1980s and early 1990s. This period saw a significant reduction in the numbers of young people convicted and imprisoned under an ostensibly punitive Conservative government publicly committed to the pursuit of 'law and order' (Allen, 1991) . While acknowledging the role of demographic changes (the overall juvenile population fell by 9 per cent over this period), critical criminologists and practitioners (for example, Bateman, 2002; Goldson, 2000; Pitts, 2001a; Rutherford, 1986; 1992) have tended to attribute these reductions to the dual practices of diversion-from-prosecution, facilitated by official endorsements of informal police cautioning (Home Office, 1985; 1990) , and bifurcation (i.e. the tendency to impose the most serious sanctions only for the most serious offences, which in practice amounts to 'diversion-from-custody').
Although by 1990 a Home Office circular was able to claim 'widespread agreement that the courts should only be used as a last resort' (Home Office, 1990: 3), this consensus was relatively short-lived. The policy became subject to critique on the grounds of 'ineffectiveness', particularly in relation to practices of repeat cautioning and the use of less 'tough' disposals such as warnings, and 'inconsistencies' in terms of application (Audit Commission, 1996) . Although disputed, such critiques became central to the reformulated (New) Labour
Party's attempts to claim greater political authority on the issue of criminal justice during this period (Bateman, 2002; Jones, 2001 (Muncie, 1999; Pitts, 2001b) . So significant were these changes, and such was the depth of the new focus on standardisation, that policy-makers and youth justice scholars began to treat the CDA 1998 as the start of an entirely new era -the start of the 'new youth justice system' (Goldson, 2000) .
Significant too was the emphasis on 'preventing offending', which the CDA 1998 introduced as a new 'principal aim' of the youth justice system. Based upon the correlation of 'risk factors' and (future) criminal behaviour, derived in turn from longitudinal studies such as the Cambridge Study of Delinquent Development (Farrington, 2000; West and Farrington, 1973) , what became known as the 'Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm' (RFPP) provided theoretical support for the increasingly interventionist youth justice developed by New Labour. Here, prevention was understood to depend upon drawing young people into services in which risk factors could be addressed -diverting them from crime by addressing welfare needs, albeit within or close to the youth justice system.
Identifying young people 'at risk' and drawing them into voluntary services such as Youth Inclusion Projects (YIPs) iii and Youth Inclusion and Support Panels (YISPs) iv was presented as a way to prevent crime, but also, in so doing, prevent the criminalisation of young people. Thus, 'diversion' became equated with 'diversion-fromcrime', which in fact implied 'early intervention', whereas 'diversion from the system' meant 'system contact' of another form (system contact following offending One aim of the new Action Plan is to divert young people away from crime, so that they are not unnecessarily drawn into the criminal justice system (cited in Home Office, 2008).
Clearly, this brief overview of policy change is schematic and reductive. We do not intend to imply that the history of diversionary practices in youth justice form a simple linear progression, nor that practice innovation is driven only by policy change. Indeed, as we go on to argue, such a position would offer little chance of accurately capturing current developments.
The current context: diverse practices of diversion
There seems to be an emerging consensus that the dramatic reduction in FTE numbers with which we opened the paper has not been driven by an explicit redirection of national policy ( The YJLD schemes developed from the recommendations of the Bradley Report (Department of Health 2009) and aim to respond, at the point of contact (usually a police custody suite) to mental health issues which are disproportionately experienced by young people in trouble with the law. They aim to 'divert' affected young people: either from the criminal justice system to health and social care services or to youth justice services 'better equipped to meet their health, emotional well-being and welfare needs' (Haines et al., 2012: 8) . The government has proposed a national roll-out of YJLD schemes for children and adults from 2014 (Public Health England, 2014).
Triage services also place YOT staff in custody suites to work with the police and Crown Prosecution Service in determining the disposal most suited to the alleged offence, their history of service contact and assessed risk (Home Office, 2012) . This can involve diverting minor cases (level one), offering supportive interventions for young people kept within the system, sometimes with the involvement of parents and carers (level two) and, in a few pilot areas, supporting but also fast-tracking young people identified as 'serious' and 'prolific' considered themselves highly restorative in general practice) and in theory the involvement of the victim had to be agreed for the intervention to go ahead, although at least one practitioner discussed a case where the victim did not want the NI but it was carried out nonetheless. Each NI was made up of an agreed contract with the young person regarding appropriate reparation for their offence, either to the victim or community.
Where there was no identifiable victim (such as drug possession) the young person would be expected to undertake other activities to 'make amends' for their offending, for example speaking with parents about their offence. Many young people were also expected to undertake activities such as victim awareness or offending behaviour programmes in conjunction with their reparation or as part of the restorative process.
Whereas Site A's decision-making approach to diversion was offence-focused, Site B practice was flexible in deciding whether an NI was appropriate, taking a more offender-focused approach in considering broader factors including the young person's offending history, their social circumstances and other factors. This meant that in practice the cohorts of young people holding NDs and NIs at the respective sites was very differentyoung people could hold more than one NI at a time (and/or at the same time as a formal order) if deemed appropriate, and could be not only first time offenders but also more serious offenders who may have already been in court or custody. Both sites undertook welfare and risk assessments at the outset of the diversion and where appropriate included a welfare component to the measure. Site A in particular, across both management and practitioners, widely believed that pre-court work including the New Disposal was a way in which to get young people and their families 'the help that they needed' (Site A report), highlighting the blurring of the conceptual boundaries between 'diversion' and 'intervention'.
A 'sea-change' in practice?
Our findings illustrate that national policy encouraging diversion via the new out of court framework (Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2013b) can be 'understood as formalising changes that had already occurred organically' (Bateman, 2014: 419) . Both New Interventions and New Disposals were presented, by managers and practitioners, as a necessary response to a challenging new economic climate and as an 'opportunity' to undertake more diversionary work which saved money compared to statutory measures.
Managers at both sites viewed the diversion schemes as a 'new' way to deal with young people's offending.
We've been phenomenally successful in diverting young people from the criminal justice system, and they're not coming back -they're not reoffending. (Site A) There has been a sea-change in the way young people are dealt with by the criminal justice system in [Site B] … diversion and restorative responses and not criminalising kids unnecessarily, and getting them out of the system rather than bringing them into the system. (Site B)
The local practices developed at both sites were presented by managers as significant 'innovations', which had pre-empted the publication of the Out-of-Court Disposals National Framework (Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2013b) . A small number of practitioners were aware of similar innovations occurring elsewhere but most considered their local approach to be unique or knew little of other YOTs' working practices.
Managers at Site B stated that the NI was developed for a number of reasons including: as a quick and effective response for the victims, to reduce costs and to lower FTEs (Site B Factsheet), but also within a broader context of preventing the criminalisation of young people. Alternatively, Site A's rationale in setting up the ND was primarily described as FTE reduction and better outcomes for young people through early intervention (Site A Effective Practice Report). Although there were similarities and differences in these two diversion schemes occurring at various stages in the process (the officially stated rationale, the decisionmakers and decision-making processes, thresholds for decisions, the number of interventions, the nature of intervention work, and the standardisation of work within service), nonetheless both sites shared a 'new' commitment (made possible by budget restrictions and loosening of central government control) to 'diversion from prosecution' and 'diversion into alternative services' (the 1980s model). And yet they were also committed to 'diversion from crime' involving forms of work similar to the risk-focused 'early intervention' discussed above (the New Labour model). Whether and to what extent these services amounted to 'diversion from the youth justice system' was also open to question at both sites, as we discuss below. Together, we argue, this indicates that we were witnessing a distinct form of 'interventionist diversion' that differed from (at least some of) the models previously observable in England and Wales and from the forms of early intervention which had preceded it.
Diversion, but not as we know it?
As the previous summaries make clear, we observed diverse practices at both our research sites and consequently we became interested in understanding the extent to which these were novel practices. The These studies suggest there are continuities in practice from juvenile justice practice pre-1998, both in models of 'diversion' that also involved an 'intervention' and in terms of a highly diverse and locally innovative practice context. Nonetheless, we would argue that what we observed is still something 'new' (see also Smith, 2014) due to the continued influence of New Labour reforms. We discuss three specific aspects of this influence below: 1) embedded managerialism and 'function creep'; 2) the continued influence of 'risk-thinking' and 'risk assessment'; and 3) practitioner commitment to (early) intervention as a preventative measure, i.e. the continued elision between 'diversion-from crime' and 'diversion from the system'.
The continued impact of New Labour reforms on diversion

Embedded managerialism and 'function creep'
The positions that practitioners in our research took about the appropriate balance between intervention and diversion were neither unanimous nor straightforward, but it is clear that many made a distinction between formal involvement in the youth justice system (and the associated criminal record) and informal alternative interventions. We observed, however, that 'informal', i.e. out-of-court, diversion schemes shared some features of 'formal' system contact. This included at one site recording the intervention on the Police National
Computer, which could potentially result in Disclosure and Barring Service disclosure (see also Carlile, 2014) , and also similarities in the actual intervention work carried out.
At one of our research sites, informal disposals could be granted after a formal disposal (which is permitted by section 138 of LASPO 2012). This meant in practice that young people could be required to complete work simultaneously on a statutory and non-statutory basis, usually with the same case manager responsible for ensuring completion in both cases. Some youth justice practitioners, although generally not those with a background in voluntary participation services, told us they found it challenging to engage some young people without the threat of breach. Whilst they aimed to prevent the case going back to court, some tried to reproduce the more familiar power dynamic by emphasising the contingency of the 'out-of-court' disposal:
With the New Interventions actually it's not just a carrot, there is a stick as well. 'Do what you said you were going to do or you still go to court'. (Site B)
We also found evidence that there appeared to be some 'sharing' of materials with statutorily ordered programmes and a continuity of practice across the different interventions, both formal and voluntary: This transfer of practice seems unremarkable in professional contexts where the performance management techniques which pre-existed but were increasingly standardised by the CDA 1998 (Pitts, 2001b) shape the current working lives -and in some cases, the entire professional experience -of practitioners to such a significant degree. We found most practitioners spent a substantial proportion of their time completing standardised documentation or in front of a computer screen (reportedly averaging between 50 and 80 per cent of their working week at both sites) and most were unable to envisage a world in which practice could take place without this paperwork (see Phoenix, forthcoming for fuller discussion):
People write too much which is why they spend too long in front of computers.
[…] They feel safer, if
we've written it all down then if you've written down every bit of information you feel like you haven't missed anything and that no one will come and criticise you for not doing that but in the process you haven't necessarily weighed what is important information. (Site B)
We found that, despite the removal of some national requirements, our studied services were still recording and reporting on many aspects of practice for local management teams and other political actors within local authorities. Some practitioners felt that the pressure to adhere to managerialist targets and 'tick boxes' had increased rather than decreased in recent years:
The world is now is that … from a managing point of view, there is a great pressure to ensure that there's [a] tick box element to it. I'm continuously as a manager sending emails saying 'I need this information, have you got this information?', there's a lot of duplication. (Site B) I think the paperwork has to be done and that's an element of the job that I don't always agree with.
I think sometimes we do things for the sake of doing it rather than for it to be of purpose, you know for it to have ticked a box. (Site A)
We suggest that this embedding of managerialist techniques of performance management have caused elements of 'function creep', which challenge claims of an absolute sea-change in practice. We loosely borrow this term from surveillance studies concerned with the spread of technologies designed for use in one domain, to other not originally intended functions (Winner 1977) . Some practitioners felt it was beneficial to adapt existing, already 'approved' ways of working with statutory cases to the new non statutory context. We suggest that this blurs distinctions between 'formal' and 'informal' system contact, while retaining the distinction between criminalisation (i.e. a criminal record) and its avoidance which was at the centre of practitioner support for the new 'diversionary' interventions.
The continued influence of 'risk-thinking' and 'risk assessment'
Similarities in 'formal and 'informal' work were similarly evident in the use of risk-based assessments which draw upon the formal ASSET framework for these new forms of pre-statutory work.
For any other case apart from a statutory court case we have a one sheet assessment. Basically it's a shortened form of an ASSET …but instead of the 12 ASSET sections you've got two or three of the sections put into different categories so it's shorter. (Site B) This is perhaps unsurprising given the extent to which 'risk thinking' has become embedded in youth justice work (for example, Baker, 2012; Case and Haines, 2009; Kemshall, 2008) . We found some evidence too of defensive practice cultures, especially within our integrated service, as youth justice practitioners responded to a shrinking workload and fears of de-professionalisation (see also Coyles, 2014) .
We've got practitioners… many of whom are greatly experienced who are now doing things far less often than they used to do… writing pre-sentence reports for example. If you're writing one 3 or 4 times a month it's probably keeping your skill level up. If you're only doing it once every 2 or 3 months I think things are going to be forgotten and the kind of sharpness of them is lost and quality deteriorates. People are less content than they were and I think we will, over time, lose the expertise that we have because either they're not practising the skills that they've got or because they have gone off to other Local Authorities who can offer them more of what they want to do… that's the downside of it. (Site B)
It seemed that the categories and scoring of 'risk' underpinning ASSET had not only become important aspects of the reasoning process, but proficient risk-based assessment was now part of the professional expertise which some youth justice workers were keen to defend.
Practitioner commitment to (early) intervention as a preventative measure
Assessments of the new practices were mixed, but at both sites, we found that many practitioners were concerned that the New Disposal and New Intervention were being used inconsistently or disproportionally.
Some were in favour of heavier and earlier intervention:
I think, if I compare how we work now to how we worked in the YISP when it was … 'at risk of offending', reprimand, final warning. If a young person came through on a reprimand they didn't even get referred to the Youth Offending Service, until they received a final warning … [with a] reprimand, they could go to the police station, sign this, don't get into trouble no more. No intervention, walk away and nine times out of ten we're going to see that young person back.
Whereas now every young person that goes to the police station and is arrested and charged for an offence is referred to the Youth Offending Service. So that very start that early stage they've been interviewed, they've had the photos took, they're referred to the youth, it's the whole impact of it all.
(Site A) I know they're meant to be soft touch which is the point of them but there's not a lot of change that you can implement within that short period of time unless you are very very good or very very lucky I think. (Site B)
Echoing the welfarist justifications of 'early intervention' (e.g. France and Utting 2005), practitioners were concerned about the erosion of broader universal provision and felt they were supporting, not punishing those with whom they worked, particularly in light of the removal of the dedicated funding for YOT prevention work.
I mean some of the families we're getting on the New Disposal have been crying out for services and they just haven't been delivered and this is the first time they're getting them from ourselves. Now I would love a world where they did get them delivered and they did have all that and they didn't need to go into criminal justice services and kids were kept out of it, but it doesn't exist, and whilst we've got the situation we've got I'm happy for us to do it in the right way. (Site A)
The new approaches to 'diversion' that we observed were therefore both 'interventionist', since they draw young people into structured programmes believed to bring behavioural change, the nature of which is shaped by the assessment of risk, and 'new', since they share features with both pre-1998 'diversion ' and post-1998 'early intervention'. We have shown how practitioners identified benefits associated with both 'diversion'
(especially the avoidance of criminalisation for minor or first time offences) and early intervention (especially the chance to offer welfare-focused support). Although we have insufficient space to analyse them here, the concerns raised by practitioners were similarly hybrid. Despite these similarities, the 'New Disposal' and 'New Intervention' were very different to one another, particularly in respect of repeated use and use with young people previously sentenced at court (see also Smith, 2014 for an extended comparison of current services).
The teams we studied also sat within very different surrounding service structures, which meant 'pre-court' work was delivered by a dedicated team at one site, but by workers also dealing with young people formally involved with the service at the second. Both these observations -the emergence of a 'new interventionist diversion' and the very different forms this is taking in different local authority areas -raise important but very challenging questions about what helps or hinders in terms of 'system contact', which we reflect on further below.
Conclusion and future research directions
Newly developed diversionary approaches were represented as a 'sea-change' in practice by some participants in our study. This article makes a case for a more complex reading, which reflects multiple understandings of diversion and its relation to other youth justice priorities, particularly the prevention of crime. We have suggested that the models of pre-court work we observed do not represent an absolute break from the 'new' youth justice established by the CDA 1998, since the elision between 'diversion from the youth justice system' and 'diversion from crime' that characterised New Labour's youth justice continues to shape some aspects of this work. Indeed, our participants described an 'interventionist diversion', where young people were 'diverted from prosecution' and 'into alternative services' which, though voluntary, closely resembled other formal interventions. Similarly, while some aspects of this work clearly echo older forms of 'diversion', the embedding of the 'risk factor prevention paradigm' and the exportation of existing practice challenge easy comparisons with the past -it is not possible to understand current trends as simply the 'rebirth' of the 1980s 'orthodoxy' in youth justice practice (Bateman, 2012) .
Our research suggests that, while criminal justice agencies are responding to the same national drivers of revised performance indicators and budgetary constraints following the financial crisis of 2008 and the introduction of so-called 'austerity' measures, the removal of many of the mechanisms for standardised youth justice practice by the Coalition Government and broader diversification in local authority service structures (e.g. Fielder et al., 2008) have brought considerable local variation. Recent policy developments in this area seem unlikely to reverse these practice trends. Sections 133-8 of LASPO specify the conditions for out-of-court disposals, but there is little detail about intervention requirements. Guidance recently issued on the new precourt sentencing framework (Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2013b) is non-statutory, and again offers very little that is prescriptive in relation to the substance of intervention, particularly in terms of the precaution or 'community resolution' work discussed above. This diversity of practice has far-reaching consequences for youth justice scholarship. In this area at least, the assumption that policy represents practice, while always reductive (Fergusson, 2007) , is now unsound, while the assumption that findings can be easily transferred even between local authority areas is questionable.
As noted at the outset, we support earlier research (for example, Cressey and McDermott, 1974 ) and more recently, Richards (2014) in highlighting the need to distinguish between 'diverse diversions'. We are uncertain, however, that the conceptual disambiguation Richards (2014) recommends will significantly advance older debates about the appropriate balance between 'intervention' and 'diversion' in youth justice without clear understanding of the specific relevant services in any given context. Unpicking the conditions under which the lessons of the past can help understand the present is, we would argue, first an empirical task. Outcomes -both in terms of FTE statistics and long-term outcomes for young people -will depend not only on the specific 'diversionary' practices adopted in any given area but also, at least for vulnerable young people, on the broader network of support services that sit outside the youth justice system and the connections between them. If researchers in England are able to exploit the current diversity of service provision to arrive at more nuanced definitions of 'system contact', as well as how this is experienced by young people in trouble with the law, we may gain clearer understandings of when it helps or hinders. A focus, therefore, on youth justice processes rather than outcomes may provide transferable if not representative research findings, help unpick the extent to which existing assumptions about 'diversion' held by practitioners, criminologists and policy-makers apply to the current youth justice landscape, and forge a new terrain of debate.
